Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING (CLOSED)

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on Tuesday, 24 January 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

1. Mr. FOSTERVOLL (Norway) said that, in the aftermath of the cold war, there was a growing recognition that the concept of security must be broadened. There was a need to continue the search for more effective measures to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation of which posed a threat to peace and international security, especially given the growing number of regional and internal conflicts.

2. Encouraging developments had taken place in the field of arms control and disarmament. In countries formerly divided by the East-West conflict, drastic reductions of nuclear and conventional weapons had been carried out. The entry into force of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (START I) and the recent agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to accelerate the destruction of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons (START II) represented tangible contributions towards making the disarmament process irreversible. At the same time, it was necessary to speed up the ratification process for the Convention on Chemical Weapons, which was also a non-proliferation treaty and was approaching universality in terms of the number of signatories.

3. Universal accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the indefinite and unconditional extension of its provisions had been one of Norway's long-standing policy objectives. Recognition of the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction must be translated into concrete action. A common priority should be to strengthen the regime for preventing nuclear proliferation. Norway welcomed the recent accession of Algeria, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine to the Treaty and the decision by Argentina to accede in the near future, and looked forward to the accession of other States before the 1995 Conference.

4. All States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which had not yet done so should conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as soon as possible. The safeguards regime should be strengthened to prevent diversion of fissile material and sensitive technology and equipment for weapons purposes.

5. The momentum achieved in the field of arms control and nuclear disarmament created favourable conditions for a successful conference of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Rapid progress should be sought on a number of related issues. In particular, the nuclear Powers must give a firm commitment to refrain from the threat to use or the use of nuclear weapons against States which did not possess such weapons and should reconfirm their commitment to a nuclear-free world.

6. Negotiations on a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing should be speeded up, in view of the unique opportunity that existed to conclude a treaty on that subject in the year ahead. In that connection, his delegation wished to stress that the notion of nuclear explosions for so-called peaceful purposes should be rejected and once again urged all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from further testing and to join other nuclear-weapon States in declaring a moratorium on such testing.

7. A ban on the further production of fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes should be considered as a matter of urgency. Concrete steps must be taken providing for transparency with respect to stockpiles of all weapons-grade materials, including plutonium and highly enriched uranium removed from warheads dismantled in pursuance of the START agreements. The illegal transfer and the smuggling of weapons-grade nuclear materials were cause for growing concern. The problem appeared to stem from an inadequate system of physical protection, deficient systems of accounting and control and insufficient border controls on such materials. Accordingly, where national systems were inadequate, international assistance should be encouraged. Agreement should be sought on more effective measures to register, manage and monitor existing stocks of plutonium. Safe and secure storage of fissile material was a matter of urgency.

8. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was not a panacea for nuclear disarmament. However, permanent legal status of the Treaty provided the best possible framework for the continuation of efforts towards a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons.

9. Mr. GRAHAM (United States of America) noted that further important developments in the area of nuclear disarmament had occurred recently and welcomed the accession of Algeria, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. His delegation hoped that other countries would become parties to the treaty in the weeks to come.

10. Another important event in connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty was the exchange of instruments of ratification of the START I treaty by the Presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States the previous month. The entry into force of that Treaty meant that it was now possible to go forward with the ratification of START II. The latter treaty provided for a reduction in the total number of warheads in the Russian Federation and the United States to no more than 3,500 and would eliminate an entire category of very destabilizing weapons, the multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missile.

11. The third event of importance since the preceding session of the Preparatory Committee was the September meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, at which the two leaders had agreed that their countries should intensify dialogue to compare conceptual approaches and to develop concrete steps to adapt their nuclear forces to the changed international security environment, including the possibility, following the ratification of START II, of further reductions of and limitations on remaining nuclear forces.

12. Over the past five years, the United States had engaged in nuclear disarmament on an unprecedented scale: all tactical nuclear weapons had been

removed from its ground and naval forces; it was dismantling up to 2,000 nuclear weapons per year; it no longer produced fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes; nuclear material in excess of defence needs had been placed under IAEA safeguards; and United States bombers were no longer on day-to-day alert.

13. The United States had already reduced its strategic warhead inventory by 47 per cent and would reduce that category of weapons by 71 per cent under START II. Warheads in non-strategic nuclear forces had been reduced by 90 per cent. Along with the Russian Federation, the United States had greatly advanced efforts towards further transparency and irreversibility of nuclear-arms reductions.

14. The United States was committed to greater progress in arms control and, more specifically, hoped that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would be achieved as soon as possible to be followed by a multilateral treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear-explosive devices. On security assurances, the United States was aware of the importance which non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty placed on the issue. In that connection, the indefinite extension of the Treaty was an absolute requirement for maintaining a stable strategic environment that would be conducive to further progress on those and other arms control measures. The achievement of an indefinite extension of the Treaty at the forthcoming Conference was one of the major objectives of United States foreign policy. A strong, durable Treaty was essential to global security as well as to the peace and stability of the entire world.

15. Mr. LAMAMRA (Algeria) said that Algeria was participating in the work of the Committee for the first time as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Algeria's accession to the Treaty, after voluntarily placing its nuclear research facilities under IAEA safeguards, was yet another expression of faith in the need to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and was a contribution to creating conditions for the success of the Conference to review and extend the Treaty. Algeria was thereby assuming its part of the collective responsibility of all States parties to making the Treaty an effective means of nuclear disarmament and of the utilization of nuclear energy for the purposes of development.

16. The end of the cold war made it necessary to establish a dynamic balance of the obligations assumed under the Treaty. In that connection, it would be wrong to restrict the attention of the participants at the forthcoming Conference merely to the question of the length of the extension of the Treaty. It was also important to strengthen the system based on it, confirm its goals and clarify the objectives of nuclear disarmament, giving that process new impetus on the basis of the progress achieved, in particular, through the systematic reduction of arsenals by the two largest nuclear Powers.

17. Whether one considered the need for the early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and a moratorium on such tests, negotiations on drawing up an agreement to prohibit the production and accumulation of fissile material or the adoption of a legally binding instrument offering security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them - everything pointed to the urgency of the Conference of the

Parties to the Treaty. The success of the work to bring about universal accession to the Treaty through, inter alia, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East and also efforts by all States having nuclear facilities to place such facilities under IAEA safeguards, would depend on the consistency of all action by the international community in that respect. The same could be said also about encouraging access to technology for the purposes of development and using nuclear energy in the interests of socio-economic progress and, above all, for developing countries.

18. Mr. ZARIF (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the views of his delegation had been included in the position paper of the Non-Aligned Movement, which had been circulated as document NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13. The concept of non-proliferation had gained momentum during the peak of the cold war. At the time, it had been promoted as an attainable first step, until a comprehensive approach towards nuclear disarmament could be formulated. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, concluded in 1968, had been drawn up on the understanding that not even one more State would become a nuclear-weapon State, and that States that decided to forego the nuclear option would be provided with positive and negative security assurances. At the same time, the non-nuclear-weapon States would be ensured full access to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. At the time, there had been a unanimous call for a limited original life-span of the Treaty with periodic reviews to determine whether the objectives of the Treaty were being pursued in a balanced manner. The forthcoming Conference provided a unique opportunity to make a thorough and comprehensive appraisal of the successes and failures of the Treaty and take a consensus decision about its future.

19. The Treaty had undoubtedly served to curtail nuclear proliferation. However, its main objective had not been accomplished, since the possession of nuclear weapons was no longer limited to the original five States. Access to nuclear weapons would not have been possible without direct or indirect assistance from the Nuclear Supplier Group. The result had been devastating for the security of States parties as well as for the credibility of the Treaty itself. That was particularly true of the Middle East, where Israel's nuclear threat had led to growing scepticism among regional States parties on the role and future of the Treaty.

20. It was evident, therefore, that non-representative groupings of limited membership could not ensure proper fulfilment of the obligations and realization of the rights enshrined in the Treaty. The process of consultations and adoption of decisions in that regard should be open to all States parties. The non-fulfilment of the obligations of nuclear suppliers had systematically been translated into further limitations on access to nuclear technology and material for peaceful purposes by States parties which complied with the provisions of the Treaty, and developing non-nuclear-weapon States had been the first to be penalized as a result.

21. Another major obstacle was the lack of a clear commitment to a zero option by all nuclear-weapon States. The adoption or reaffirmation of such a commitment needed to be coupled with a time-frame and target date for nuclear disarmament. Progress in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and cut-off of fissile material production were important measures for

completing the non-proliferation scheme. There was still stalemate on the issue of providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

22. It was doubtful whether the major changes required to permit indefinite extension of the Treaty would come about in the time remaining before the April Conference. An indefinite extension of the Treaty would only be possible once all its obligations, including nuclear disarmament, had been implemented and the rights of the signatories, including the inalienable right to peaceful application of the technology, had been realized. In the meantime, the only viable option was a form of extension that was founded on continued close periodic scrutiny of the Treaty, was in line with an objective interpretation of Article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, and enjoyed consensus support. It was advisable that insistence on extreme options should give way to an expedient and broadly acceptable solution that had a chance of gaining consensus support. The Iranian delegation believed that the text of the Treaty provided for such an option.

23. Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria) reiterated that Nigeria was a strong supporter of the NPT; it had been one of the first countries to sign and ratify the Treaty and believed that it remained a viable instrument for promoting international peace and security. But at the same time the rights and obligations assumed by the Treaty parties remained unequal, which made its perpetual extension inappropriate.

24. As long as nuclear weapons existed, however, the NPT had a continuing role to play, and its content and duration should be determined at the forthcoming Conference. The fundamental purpose of the Treaty would be served if it could be used as a basis for achieving a binding regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, totally eliminating such weapons and promoting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

25. His delegation was concerned that there were suggestions of irreconcilable differences regarding the decision that needed to be taken about the extension. That should not be the case. The options were well known and all that was needed was a political decision on a legal basis which would take into account the extent to which the Treaty's objectives were being met and the expectations of the international community.

26. At its current session, the Preparatory Committee should complete all procedural aspects of preparation for the Conference and make progress on substantive matters, looking to the future rather than going back to issues that had already been settled. The question of the legal interpretations of Article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty and the possible options in that regard had been settled by General Assembly resolution 49/75 F. The point of departure for the work of the Conference should be a programme of action listing the definitive steps that needed to be taken to move towards the goal envisaged by the non-proliferation regime, such as the elaboration of a reasonable and practical timetable for nuclear disarmament which would serve as a basis for a decision to extend the NPT, possibly for a series of renewable fixed periods.

27. The current session of the Preparatory Committee should eliminate existing differences and develop a give-and-take approach enabling consensus to be built.

He hoped that the outcome of the 1995 Conference would be acceptable to all States parties and urged States that had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so.

28. Mr. GORITA (Romania) noted with satisfaction the progress that had been made in preparing for the forthcoming Conference, while recognizing the important tasks that still lay ahead. He hoped that the Committee would rapidly conclude its work on the agenda, rules of procedure and final documents for the Conference.

29. The NPT was the cornerstone of the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and all countries, both those with and without nuclear weapons, stood to benefit from an indefinite extension of the Treaty. To achieve that goal, countries should approach the Conference in a spirit of compromise.

30. Many elements of the non-proliferation regime were posited on the existence of the Treaty, and States which strictly abided by the requirements of the regime should have no cause to complain about it. Romania had actively participated in the elaboration of regimes designed to develop responsible proliferation control, covering weapons of mass destruction, long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies. The Romanian Government had publicly committed itself to complying with the guidelines and the spirit of the relevant regimes, and had adopted appropriate legislation to that end.

31. An indefinite extension of the Treaty would send a signal that the great majority of countries wished to put a permanent end to the further spread of nuclear weapons, and would thus send a warning to any Government thinking of acquiring them. The Conference should be a forum for joint efforts to obtain universality of the Treaty, promote nuclear disarmament and cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, strengthen the verification regime and assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

32. The fact that the number of nuclear-weapon States had remained unchanged for 25 years was a measure of the success of the NPT. The Treaty had established norms of international behaviour, and nobody could deny that its existence had been essential to the efforts to keep three republics of the former USSR non-nuclear. That was a clear benefit of keeping the NPT in force indefinitely.

33. Romania welcomed the significant progress that had been achieved in other areas to strengthen the global non-proliferation system, particularly within the scope of the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The conclusion of a multilateral and effectively verifiable convention on cut-off of fissile material production for nuclear-weapons purposes would constitute an important addition to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Romania looked forward to the early completion of work on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, welcomed the accession of Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine to the Treaty, and expressed the hope that other countries which had not yet done so would also accede.

34. Romania strongly supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, and fully shared the view expressed in that connection by the

representative of France on behalf of the European Union. A Treaty of unlimited duration would provide additional assurances of international stability and security and, under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, would encourage the development of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology.

35. Mr. VALENCIA (Ecuador) said that his delegation welcomed the change in the programme of work designed to promote a general exchange of views. Such an approach would make it easier to reach preliminary agreement on the basic points to be considered at the Conference in April 1995. He believed that the extension and review of the NPT was a basic issue that needed to be addressed, and would be a major test for all States parties to that document and the international community as a whole. The negotiations at the Conference in April should indicate what efforts were being made by all States to achieve the basic goals of general and complete disarmament stipulated in Article VI of the Treaty. The attainment of that goal meant the final elimination of nuclear weapons, since the existence of such weapons still constituted a serious threat to the main purpose of the United Nations - the maintenance of international peace and security.

36. In the view of his delegation, there were three available options for extending the Treaty: it could be extended for an indefinite period, for an additional fixed period, or for several successive periods. Adopting the first option would perpetuate the right of existing nuclear Powers to maintain their arsenals. In the event of conflict or military and political confrontation in various parts of the world, there would always be the latent threat that nuclear weapons would be used. Extending the treaty for a single period would maintain the uncertainty of the situation with respect to nuclear weapons after that period had expired. Furthermore, it would serve as an incentive to States to make plans to produce or acquire nuclear weapons after the expiry of the Treaty, which would run counter to the very objective of non-proliferation.

37. His delegation was, in principle, in favour of extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty for several successive periods. That would allow for review and amendment of the Treaty to take into account the constantly evolving international situation. It would also maintain a balance between the rights and obligations of nuclear-weapon States and those of States which did not possess such weapons. That would make it possible for measures to be taken gradually to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely and would facilitate a solution to the problems encountered at previous review conferences.

38. The Conference could not conclude without taking a decision on the extension of the Treaty. Such a possibility was not envisaged in the Treaty or in the rules of procedure. It would have the most serious consequences for all mankind. In that connection, his delegation hoped that the proposals it had put forward together with other initiatives could serve as a basis for the deliberations of the Conference.

39. Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka) said that the forthcoming Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons would have to resolve major issues of substance. Noting the constructive ideas put forward by the non-aligned countries at the preceding session of the Preparatory Committee, he

expressed the hope that other delegations and groups would likewise present constructive contributions of their own.

40. Current conditions were particularly appropriate for a collective review of the Treaty and the taking of decisions concerning its future. Nevertheless, there was still a long way to go towards realizing fully the purposes and provisions of the Treaty. Although demand for nuclear energy as a source of power seemed to be diminishing, demand for other applications, for example in medicine and agriculture, had increased, especially in the developing countries. There had not been, however, a corresponding increase in funding for technical assistance relating to such activities.

41. He noted in particular the "resilience" of the Treaty, which had survived the era of cold war and global confrontation. All States had much at stake in the Treaty. The future of the Treaty must be settled in concert by all the parties, for neither legal norms nor numbers could really substitute for a consensus which accommodated the legitimate concerns of all. The answer lay in nurturing all that was positive and promising and in transforming it into a comprehensive test-ban treaty, negative security assurances, and the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. A ban on the production of fissile materials would be a strong supportive measure for the Treaty and the establishment of a non-discriminatory treaty regime. That view was now receiving widespread support. Now that all the nuclear-weapon States had become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the non-nuclear States parties could justifiably expect more tangible achievements with respect to negative security assurances and negotiations on nuclear disarmament. His delegation would work closely with all delegations to ensure a productive review and extension of the Treaty in 1995.

42. Mr. IBRAHIM (Indonesia) said that his delegation attached the utmost importance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and acknowledged its contribution towards nuclear disarmament. And yet the Treaty contained fundamental shortcomings. The efforts of the non-nuclear States during the negotiations on the Treaty to secure an acceptable balance of obligations and responsibilities vis-à-vis the nuclear Powers had not succeeded. In spite of the Treaty's discriminatory nature during the 25 years in which it had been in force, no serious efforts had been made by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve the objectives clearly enunciated in both the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty. As a result, while horizontal proliferation had been accepted as the concern of all States, vertical proliferation remained the exclusive prerogative of the nuclear-weapon States and had never been treated as a valid issue for multilateral negotiations.

43. The provisions of the Treaty stipulating that it was to remain in force for 25 years were intended to link the question of the duration of the Treaty to progress in nuclear disarmament. His delegation therefore shared the view that nuclear disarmament must have a clear perspective within a specific time-frame in order for any non-proliferation regime to succeed. It also fully shared the concerns of many countries and non-governmental organizations about the actions of some nuclear Powers which were incompatible with that objective. Nevertheless, his delegation recognized that with the end of the cold war

nuclear-weapon States had entered into agreements that would significantly reduce and eliminate their stockpiles.

44. An overriding question continued to dominate the non-proliferation agenda, namely, the relationship between the dissemination of nuclear know-how and the satisfaction of the development needs of the developing countries through the use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. It was regrettable that the fundamental objective of full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes had not been achieved, particularly in the case of the developing countries which were signatories to the Treaty. The unilateral imposition of restrictions and the formation of exclusive clubs, and unfounded apprehensions concerning the intentions of the parties with regard to nuclear-weapons capability and the acquisition of such weapons had all been used to deny developing countries unimpeded access to nuclear technology.

45. The importance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty could not be overemphasized. The successful conclusion of such a treaty would have a profound impact on the outcome of the 1995 review conference.

46. His delegation considered that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones would not only improve the atmospherics of the Treaty but would also reflect the changing strategic situation.

47. Unless the existing disagreements were resolved, the Treaty's effectiveness would be increasingly called into question and a decision on the Treaty's extension would hinge on its perceived value to the vast majority of non-nuclear States. In that connection, the proposal to link specific measures of nuclear-arms limitation to the question of the extension of the Treaty deserved consideration. That meant that a constructive dialogue satisfying all the parties had now become imperative if the Treaty was to be extended beyond 1995.

48. Mr. KISLYAK (Russian Federation) said that the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was an international event of paramount importance in terms of the achievement of strategic stability. The main task of the Conference was to reach a decision on the extension of the Treaty, inasmuch as all States - large and small, nuclear and non-nuclear alike - needed the Treaty and the Treaty's effective operation must continue in the future. His delegation noted the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty as a non-nuclear State and expressed the hope that by the time of the 1995 Conference additional States would have become parties to the Treaty.

49. The Russian Federation noted with satisfaction that the process of nuclear disarmament had been gaining momentum, especially in recent years, as evidenced by the entry into force of the START I Treaty followed by the ratification of the even more far-reaching START II, which would radically reduce the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. In accordance with the agreements reached between Russia and the United States, following the ratification of the START II Treaty, the two countries would begin to deactivate all the vehicles to be reduced in accordance with the Treaty. His delegation expressed the hope that in the near future all the nuclear States would join the process of agreed reductions of nuclear weapons.

50. At the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the President of the Russian Federation had put forward proposals regarding the conclusion of a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, the implementation of which could help to speed up that process. The Russian Federation delegation to the Conference on Disarmament had clear-cut instructions with regard to the speedy elaboration of a nuclear-test-ban treaty and the adoption of a mandate for negotiations on a ban on the manufacture of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Russia was prepared to seek mutually acceptable decisions with regard to security guarantees for the non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which would create favourable conditions for the development of broad international cooperation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, taking duly into account the needs of the developing countries. In full compliance with article IV of the Treaty, Russia was making a tangible contribution to the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in that sphere, including within the framework of IAEA.

51. In conclusion, his delegation wished to emphasize several fundamental points. Given the singular importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons every effort must be made for its unconditional and indefinite extension. The decisions of the Preparatory Committee on both the procedural and substantial issues should help to facilitate the achievement of that goal.

52. Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) said that the final stage had begun in the process of preparing for the Conference to review and extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In the course of that process significant progress had been made in creating the necessary conditions for the holding of the Conference. Nevertheless, there were still a number of important issues outstanding. It could be expected that negotiations at the Conference would be extremely complex since a decision was to be taken on the future of an international instrument about which views differed. While there was recognition that the Treaty had made a major contribution to international peace and security, a significant group of countries found a number of the Treaty's provisions to be discriminatory and believed that some States parties were not duly complying with its provisions. There was, however, universal recognition that the Treaty must be extended. There were significant differences on the matter and opinions varied concerning the period for which the Treaty should be extended.

53. His delegation considered that in spite of the fact that negotiations at the Conference would be extremely difficult and intense, the prospects for success were excellent if countries refrained from attempts to impose their views and demonstrated the necessary degree of political will. His delegation considered that States parties to the Conference should take into account to a greater extent the following considerations. Article X, paragraph 2, represented a compromise between the countries which had argued during the negotiations in favour of concluding the Treaty for an indefinite period, and those which had favoured a limited period. The fact that the solution adopted represented a political compromise reinforced the view that the decision to be taken by the Conference should be of a political nature. That decision should be directed towards strengthening the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and reflect the firm support of all States for the Treaty.

54. Venezuela had put forward a proposal aimed at reconciling the differing interests with respect to the Treaty. In accordance with its proposal, a decision should be taken at the conference to extend the period of the Treaty for a further 25 years, while conferences to review the operation of the Treaty would be held every 5 years and a conference to decide on its extension would be held at the end of the 25-year period. Thus it would be a matter of extending the Treaty for an additional fixed period, after which the States parties would have to take a new decision on the basis of the provisions of article X, paragraph 2. The Venezuelan proposal deserved broad support, since it could serve as the basis for a consensus decision. The prospects of adopting the proposal by consensus would be enhanced if the nuclear Powers gave a firm and solemn demonstration of their determination to step up efforts to comply with their obligations under the Treaty, particularly with respect to the holding of serious negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

55. Mr. BERGH (South Africa) said that South Africa's keen interest in the forthcoming Conference of the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty arose from the commitment of the Government of National Unity to a policy of non-proliferation and arms control. During the inter-sessional period, the South African Government had requested the Office of the Chief State Law Adviser to prepare a legal interpretation of article X, paragraph 2, which his delegation would make available to the other delegations in due course.

56. An analysis of the three different interpretations of the provisions concerning the extension of the Treaty warranted the conclusion that three distinct options had been intended. If the Treaty was to have unlimited duration, it could be terminated only after all the parties had withdrawn from it or after it had been terminated in accordance with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If the Treaty was to be extended for a fixed period, it would lapse at the end of that period. The option of extension for additional fixed periods was not as clear. The latter alternative presupposed the existence of an appropriate decision-making mechanism, which could be either "negative" or "positive". If a "negative" mechanism was chosen, each new fixed period would follow automatically on the preceding one, unless the parties decided at the end of any of the fixed periods not to continue with the Treaty. If a "positive" mechanism was chosen, at the end of each fixed period, the parties could have a say in determining whether to continue with the Treaty. In other words, the Treaty would continue to the next fixed period only if the majority of the parties so decided. Such a "positive" mechanism was, in the view of his delegation, consistent with the idea of constant review of the Treaty and with the provisions of article X, paragraph 2, according to which the parties could "decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force". A decision-making process similar to the one now proposed was therefore already part of the Treaty.

57. He expressed the hope that the decision on extending the Treaty which would be taken in April would be based on the political will of the parties to reach a compromise that would serve the common goal, which was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

58. Mr. HALLAK (Syrian Arab Republic) said that the proliferation of nuclear weapons represented a threat to peace and security and that the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the cornerstone of efforts to control that phenomenon. As one of the steps towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the Treaty was not without its shortcomings. There was a glaring imbalance between the obligations of the non-nuclear States and the privileges enjoyed by the nuclear States. Accordingly, the following goals should be pursued: a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons; the universality of the Treaty; the provision of effective guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States; the right of States not possessing nuclear weapons to access to new technologies for peaceful purposes; an effective mechanism for control and supervision; practical steps conducive to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, in particular in the Middle East; and the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban Treaty.

59. Consistent with its belief that the possession of nuclear weapons by any State in a sensitive region represented a threat to the entire world the Syrian Arab Republic had been one of the first countries to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accordingly it had hoped that the momentum would eventually lead even Israel to sign the Treaty, after dissuading it from its persistent intention to acquiring nuclear weapons. However, in the 25 years in which the Treaty had been in existence, Israel had not acceded to it and had so far refused to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime. If the Middle East was to become a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction, all States in the Middle East must accede to the Treaty, especially in view of the peace process that was under way in the region. No one State must be allowed to secure a privileged position at the expense of others.

60. With respect to the question of extending the Treaty, his delegation believed that there was a need to review the operation of the Treaty. First and foremost, Israel must accede to the Treaty, place its nuclear facilities under the safeguards regime and eliminate its nuclear stockpiles. The nuclear-weapon States must assume the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and to refrain from the threat of use of such weapons. They must also eliminate nuclear weapons according to a strict timetable. It would then become possible for the States of the Middle East to agree to an extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

61. Mr. COUSINS (Australia) said that there had been a number of significant developments since September 1994. Algeria, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine had become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. His delegation was particularly pleased that Ukraine had finally removed the uncertainty surrounding its position and had reaffirmed its commitment to destroy all nuclear weapons on its soil. That step by Ukraine was also a key element in ensuring that the next stage of historic and deep nuclear-arms reductions by the United States of America and the Russian Federation would proceed.

62. His delegation was pleased that work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty had continued intersessionally and that in 1994, for the very first time, all five nuclear-weapon States had sponsored the General Assembly's draft resolution on the subject.

63. His delegation expected that the Conference on Disarmament, which would resume its work the following week, would agree without delay on a mandate for negotiations on a convention prohibiting the production of fissionable material, which was a new measure in the field of disarmament.

64. The framework agreement between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was a major contribution to non-proliferation and international security, and his delegation congratulated both parties. His delegation looked forward to the early implementation of the agreement and had informed the parties directly involved that Australia would contribute to the implementation process.

65. His delegation welcomed the continuation of the Middle East peace process and, in particular, the achievements of the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security. Progress in arms control and non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East were a key to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction in that region and beyond.

66. There had, however, been developments that were less pleasing. In October 1994, China had conducted another nuclear test. His delegation hoped that China would heed the views of the international community and halt its nuclear tests. There continued to be insufficient progress on nuclear security assurances. His delegation hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would soon issue a new harmonized position on security assurances.

67. Article IV of the Treaty was one of the major strands of the intertwining obligations and benefits that comprised the Treaty. From the very beginning of the nuclear age, countries had struggled with the challenge of how to cooperate with one another in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without facilitating the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It had long been recognized that nuclear trade and cooperation required an assured environment of security and stability over the long term. The provisions of articles I to IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provided the long-term secure environment. The parties to the Treaty were faced with the challenge of ensuring that they emerged from the conference on the review and extension of the Treaty with that secure environment intact.

68. In recent months, reports of the smuggling of nuclear material had been a source of mounting concern. That had underlined, as nothing else could, the obligations of States to take action at the national level to ensure that nuclear material did not end up in the hands of those who would misuse it for non-peaceful purposes. Nuclear establishments and the transport of nuclear material required appropriate physical protection, and States needed to have effective border controls so that they had control over what left their territory and were able to carry out their non-proliferation obligations not to permit sensitive nuclear materials to be transmitted to non-peaceful programmes or to terrorist groups.

69. Australia engaged in nuclear cooperation within a strict non-proliferation framework. Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty was an essential minimum requirement for access to Australian uranium exports. At the same time, Australia took seriously its obligations under article IV of the Treaty.

Australia's contribution to the implementation of article IV would be the subject of a paper to be circulated at the Conference.

70. Human resources development had been a feature of Australia's cooperation programmes over many years and, since 1970, Australia had offered training courses in many areas.

71. The Technical Cooperation and Assistance Fund of IAEA was the principal source of funding for international nuclear technical cooperation activities, and Australia had long been a strong supporter of the Fund. Australia routinely paid, in full and on time, its assessed contributions to the regular budget of IAEA, a significant proportion of which supported the Agency's technical cooperation activities.

72. A second major pillar of Australia's nuclear technical cooperation activities had been the Agency's Regional Cooperative Agreement for Asia and the Pacific, which Australia had joined in 1977. The projects carried out under the Agreement emphasized the use of well-developed nuclear technologies to improve the standard of living in the region. Over the period 1977-1995, Australia had given more than $3 million for activities under the Agreement. In addition to its nuclear cooperation activities within the framework of IAEA and the Regional Cooperative Agreement, Australia had provided funds and technical assistance for several bilateral nuclear cooperation projects.

73. Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a key article. His delegation looked forward to a thorough and informed review of its operation at the Conference and hoped that ideas would emerge that would help in a practical way to improve cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the implementation of the multilateral programmes of IAEA.

74. Mr. Wonil CHO (Republic of Korea) said that his country sincerely hoped that the upcoming Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would be a forum for the continued reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime. The Government of the Republic of Korea reaffirmed its support for the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, it considered that both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States must strive for the rigorous fulfilment of their obligations. The Korean Government hoped that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty would meet their obligations faithfully, particularly those set forth in articles IV and VI of the Treaty.

75. His delegation reiterated its wish that the Conference on Disarmament should expedite its negotiating process on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and its preparation of a convention prohibiting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons, since that would contribute significantly to the establishment of a permanent NPT regime.

76. His delegation also wished to see further cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Access to nuclear expertise and know-how in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be provided unconditionally to developing countries that had proven that they could fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.

77. His delegation hoped that, at its current and last meeting, the Preparatory Committee would satisfactorily conclude all the pending procedural issues, especially the agenda and the rules of procedure for the Conference, which would help ensure its success.

78. Mr. MUNTASSER (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), reaffirming his Government's position, said that further steps needed to be taken to bring about the complete elimination and prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction. Since the goal of the Treaty was to rid the world of nuclear weapons, it was important to support all efforts directed towards achieving that goal. His delegation placed great hopes in the negotiations that were under way within the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and hoped for a satisfactory outcome of that negotiating process.

79. His delegation also hoped that successful results would be achieved at the forthcoming Conference. However, that would be possible only if the interests and requirements of all the States parties to the Treaty were taken into account. A number of States parties had put forward the view that the question of the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty should occupy a central place in the work of the Conference. His delegation did not agree with that view. The Conference should approach the question of the extension of the Treaty not in an automatic manner, but in association with other equally important issues, above all the question of offering assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States (which constituted the majority of parties to the Treaty) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. Regardless of the scale of reductions in nuclear weapons, peace throughout the world was threatened by the very existence of nuclear arsenals. Non-nuclear-weapon States must have access to the newest technologies for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty was needed which would provide for effective control of nuclear weapons.

80. One of the objectives of the Treaty was to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had consistently advocated the establishment of such a zone in Africa. It was particularly important to turn the Middle East into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. In that region there was still a security imbalance because of Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons. There was no doubt that the countries and peoples of that region would be under a constant threat until Israel acceded to the Treaty, stopped the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. That was all the more necessary because most States had voluntarily rejected the nuclear option.

81. His delegation's position on the question of the indefinite extension of the Treaty was that in order to achieve consensus, the following were required: a comprehensive review of the Treaty with a view to eliminating all its shortcomings; the acceptance by the nuclear-weapon States of the obligation to stop the development of nuclear weapons and destroy such weapons under a strict timetable; the assumption by those States of the obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; and Israel's accession to the Treaty, destruction of its nuclear stockpiles and placing of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

82. Mr. AGONA (Uganda) said that like most countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, Uganda believed that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had succeeded in establishing an international norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and had therefore become one of the most significant elements of global security. The large increase in the number of parties to the Treaty was indicative of its significance and continued viability. On the basis of those considerations Uganda, in principle, supported the extension of the Treaty. However, it believed that the ultimate aim of the Treaty was still the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Uganda therefore viewed the Treaty as part of a process towards that end.

83. The forthcoming Conference would have to take a decision on the question of extending the Treaty. Uganda believed that, in the changed international circumstances, the extension of the Treaty should no longer be taken for granted. That question must be viewed against the background of an assessment of whether States parties were fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty, especially under the preamble and article VI.

84. His delegation was convinced that the duration of the Treaty and its subsequent extensions should be explicitly linked to progress in nuclear disarmament and, more specifically, to the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a short-term objective. It felt that China's proposal of 1996 as the year to achieve that goal was realistic and reasonable. It also considered it necessary to establish the principle of periodic reviews and assessments before further extensions were made.

85. Uganda was convinced that the continued possession of nuclear weapons by some countries without any conditions would remain a destabilizing factor. It was the lack of tangible commitment to nuclear disarmament that was the real threat to the Treaty, not the legitimate right of States parties to review the Treaty from time to time. Moreover, the non-nuclear-weapon States must be given security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them through a legally binding international instrument as a condition for the renewal of the Treaty regime.

86. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be assisted in acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful applications in such areas as agriculture, medicine, water conservation, resource development and so forth. Only limited resources had been devoted to assisting countries which had acceded to the Treaty. However, a number of countries which were not parties to the Treaty had benefited much more from such assistance. The safeguard provisions of the Treaty were important and should be strengthened. However, the provisions regarding assistance to developing countries in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy were equally important.

87. His delegation stressed its view that the Treaty was part of a broader effort to ban nuclear weapons leading to their ultimate destruction. It would therefore support only those proposals for extension that had that objective.

88. Mrs. FRITSCHE (Liechtenstein) said that Liechtenstein attached great importance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a means of safeguarding international peace and strengthening the security of States.

The Treaty was not perfect, but was the only Treaty providing an acceptable framework for security in the nuclear age. Liechtenstein was among those States parties which supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty; that would strengthen its impact as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime.

89. In Liechtenstein's view, the best way of guaranteeing nuclear non-proliferation was universal accession to the Treaty and full compliance with the obligations deriving from it. In that connection, it welcomed the recent accession to the Treaty of Algeria, Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

90. Her delegation expressed the hope that the 1995 Conference would be a forum of joint efforts in the direction of extending the Treaty and its universality, ensuring international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and strengthening the verification system and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The latter was of particular importance for small States whose only protection was respect for international law.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Fourth session

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING (CLOSED)

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 24 January 1995, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland)

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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

ORGANIZATION OF THE 1995 CONFERENCE (continued)

(2) AGENDA

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95-80160 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. GARCIA (Colombia) expressed his delegation's condolences to the people of Japan following the terrible earthquake which had just occurred there.

2. Reverting to the debate, he said that in elaborating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the States Parties had not only sought to establish a reliable method of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; their intention had also been to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

3. That intention was expressed in the preamble to the Treaty, in which the States Parties undertook to put an end to nuclear weapons tests and to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The same intention was found in article VI of the Treaty, which set forth the undertaking of each of the Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

4. It was precisely in that light that the Treaty should be reviewed and that, taking into account article X, paragraph 2, the modalities of its extension should be established.

5. The objective of eliminating nuclear weapons should not be lost sight of or minimized; efforts should be made to attain that objective within specific time-limits, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Treaty. The success of the Conference would depend not only on the automatic extension of the Treaty, but also on the determination with which States Parties were able to assess and confront the challenges they encountered in the areas of non-proliferation and disarmament.

6. To that end, measures to strengthen the existing regime and ensure strict respect for it in the area of non-proliferation should be identified; those measures were listed in document NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/12.

7. Furthermore, the debate on the interpretation of article X, paragraph 2, should not overshadow the consideration of substantive issues relating to respect for the obligations assumed by States Parties under the terms of the Treaty. Lastly, in view of the importance of the work of the Conference of States Parties, it was desirable that it should take its decisions on substantive issues by consensus.

8. Mr. HRYSHCHENKO (Ukraine), after expressing his delegation's condolences to the people of Japan, said that Ukraine had only recently acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons after an intensive discussion in the Ukrainian Parliament and in Ukrainian society as a whole. Ukraine had taken that decision after resolving the problems of obtaining security guarantees from

the nuclear-weapon States, compensation for the nuclear weapons withdrawn from its territory, and tangible assistance in the implementation of the complex programme of elimination of nuclear weapons.

9. Ukraine's accession to the Treaty and the exchange of instruments of ratification to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I) had been the starting-point for a substantial reduction of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world; the formal obstacles to ratification of the Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-II) by the United States of America and the Russian Federation had thus been removed.

10. In voluntarily relinquishing the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union and systematically eliminating those weapons in accordance with the international agreements it had signed, Ukraine was offering a true example of unilateral nuclear disarmament which significantly strengthened the international non-proliferation regime; it hoped that that example would be followed by the countries which still possessed nuclear arsenals: that would contribute to the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It hoped, in particular, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation would ratify the START-II Treaty by the beginning of the Conference and that the other three nuclear-weapon States would announce specific measures of substantial reduction of their nuclear arsenals and means of delivery.

11. While the situation of Ukraine, which had succeeded to the nuclear weapons in its territory after gaining independence, was unique and could not always serve as a precedent for other States, its experience could be applied in the search for answers to key issues which were crucial for the success of the Conference.

12. It was clear that the results of the Conference would be crucial for the maintenance of stability and security in the world. For that reason Ukraine supported in principle the idea of an indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the same time, that goal could not be achieved unless the five nuclear Powers took specific steps for nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. Moreover, a number of political issues needed to be resolved, including: the elaboration of a multilateral regime of security guarantees by the nuclear Powers to non-nuclear-weapon States; the successful conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; reaching agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and solving the problem of the elimination of existing stocks; establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East and Africa; and strengthening the IAEA safeguards as part of the international regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It should be stressed in that respect that in signing a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ukraine had demonstrated its commitment to strengthening the role of IAEA in enhancing the implementation of the basic provisions of the Treaty.

13. It was important that the strengthening of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime should be linked with broader international cooperation

in the sphere of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, both at the bilateral level and within the framework of the relevant international organizations.

14. Mr. SYCHOU (Belarus) expressed condolences on behalf of his Government to the Japanese Government and people in the wake of the earthquake which had devastated the city of Kobe.

15. With regard to the question under consideration, Belarus had always, in all forums, taken a firm stance which, far from being motivated by political considerations, derived from the basic provisions of the Constitution. His country's foreign policy was governed by article 18 of the Basic Law, which set forth the principles of equality among States, non-resort to force, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

16. Moreover, Belarus had been the first State to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear Power when nuclear weapons were still in its territory, and had done so unconditionally, just as it had evacuated medium- and short-range missiles from its territory, ratified the Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and signed a number of other international agreements in the field of disarmament. That decision had, of course, been a difficult one to take, since for Belarus, as for other States, including developed States, it represented a heavy economic burden. Nevertheless, by ensuring the safe evacuation of its weapons from its territory, Belarus had made a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security.

17. At a time when the expansion of the nuclear danger remained a threat, the example of Belarus deserved general support. However, the Belarusian people had difficulty in understanding why the efforts they had made were not widely appreciated; that might create some difficulties in the pursuit of the disarmament process. While his Government was determined to observe the commitments which it had made, the burden which they imposed on the national economy might be too heavy at the current stage. For that reason, Belarus would be grateful if its contribution to the Conference budget could be reduced to 0.28 per cent, irrespective of the scale of assessed contributions established by the General Assembly for the biennium 1995-1997.

18. At a time when national security should be seen more and more in the context of military and political stability at the regional and international levels, the time had come to apply the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments.

19. Belarus deemed it necessary to adopt effective measures to strengthen the regime governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The accession of Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be welcomed. It was important for the Treaty to be extended immediately and unconditionally and for other States to express their commitment to the cause of disarmament. That meant that nuclear-weapon States must provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. One could well understand the fears of the nuclear Powers at a time when nuclear weapons

were beyond the control of a system established dozens of years earlier. However, Belarus had confidence in the decisions to be taken by its partners in the disarmament process. At the dawn of the third millennium, security could only be global and equal for all States which made a real contribution to nuclear security.

20. The disarmament process should be gradual; it could not take place without the extension of the Treaty. It was to be hoped that all States parties would bear that in mind. For its part, Belarus was determined to pursue its civilized policy and to declare its support for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and for the conclusion of an agreement in that area. It was prepared to work towards a legally binding instrument containing security assurances provided by the nuclear Powers to the non-nuclear-weapon States and other disarmament verification machinery.

21. Mr. ELARABY (Egypt) stressed the progress made in the preparations for the 1995 Conference from both the institutional and the procedural standpoints. It was generally recognized that while the NPT regime played a crucial role in the maintenance of international peace and security, it could be undermined seriously, perhaps even irreversibly, by the proliferation of nuclear weapons in various parts of the world.

22. For that reason, when the Treaty had been drafted, it had been provided with a "safety net" consisting of three basic elements. First, the Treaty was to be ratified universally; in Egypt's view, that meant that all States, without exception, should accede to it and that no State should be permitted to enjoy a special status while benefiting from the advantages of the Treaty. Secondly, all States parties, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon alike, were to carry out in good faith their obligations and responsibilities under the relevant provisions of the Treaty. Thirdly, a time-frame had been agreed upon for the achievement of the purposes of the Treaty; the life-span of the Treaty had been fixed at 25 years (art. X, para. 2), after which it would be decided whether the Treaty would remain in force for an indefinite period or would be extended for an additional fixed period or for additional fixed periods; moreover, every five years, the operation of the Treaty would be reviewed in order to ensure that the purposes of the preamble and the other provisions of the Treaty were being fulfilled (art. VIII, para. 3).

23. If the Treaty was to be an effective, viable and credible instrument, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must be concluded and the non-nuclear-weapon States parties must be provided with watertight assurances. In that connection, the Security Council had adopted resolution 255 (1968), which many now deemed inadequate and obsolete and in need of updating.

24. The importance of regional arrangements was recognized in article VII of the Treaty. For its part, the Middle East region could ill afford any ambiguity with regard to nuclear weapons proliferation. Egypt had repeatedly affirmed its deep conviction that all States in the region, without exception, should become parties to the NPT and should place their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Moreover, a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be established with an effective verification system and appropriate confidence-building measures, the

better to ensure the application of the Treaty by all countries in the region without exception.

25. Stable and long-lasting security in the Middle East could be achieved only through a lower level of armaments in the region, the assurance of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the application of arms control measures by all States in the region without exception in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. That clearly meant that Israel must accede to the Treaty and place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards.

26. To the extent that the Treaty had succeeded in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and arresting the nuclear arms race, that had been due to the political commitment of the non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty, whereas States with more ambiguous nuclear programmes had not displayed the same level of commitment. Many doubts had been raised as to whether the objectives of the Treaty had been fulfilled and many non-nuclear weapons States, including Egypt, had recently expressed their disillusionment in that regard.

27. Any decision on the conduct of the Conference should emanate from an in-depth assessment of how the Treaty could enhance the national and international security of the States parties, taking all the relevant factors into account. In order to choose between the three options in article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, all States parties should try to reach consensus, because that was the only way to assure the viability and credibility of the Treaty. The Egyptian position would depend on the progress made over the following few months. The issue of universality was of paramount importance because despite its unwavering commitment to the objectives of the Treaty, Egypt could not ignore its immediate regional concerns and whether the Treaty had been able to address them.

28. Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, reminded the Committee that, seeking to belittle the importance of the framework agreement concluded between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to hamper the implementation of that agreement, the representative of France had spoken of the continued risk posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In fact it was France which was selling large quantities of plutonium and had absolutely no intention of embarking on nuclear disarmament. In reality France cared little for the Treaty, having already said that each State had the right to arm itself as it saw fit in order to guarantee its security. It was therefore hypocritical to talk of non-proliferation. Moreover, the age of arbitrary fiats by the great Powers was in the past.

29. Mr. ERRERA (France), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, pointed out that in his statement the previous day he had spoken on behalf of the European Union, that is to say on behalf of 15 States. Moreover, with regard to the uncalled-for remarks directed at France, Korea would do well to stay silent on the matter of hypocrisy.

ORGANIZATION OF THE 1995 CONFERENCE

(2) AGENDA

30. Mr. BAIDI-NAJED (Islamic Republic of Iran) noted that the Iranian delegation had expressed its opinion at the third meeting about the different options for the current wording of agenda item 16, which had received wide support from the non-aligned countries. Either the Committee could restrict itself to merely mentioning the articles and letting the Conference establish any relationship it deemed necessary between them, or it could explicitly indicate the existing relationship between certain articles. If the first option was chosen, all reference to other articles could be dropped, namely the last part of item 16 C (1) ("especially in their relationship to article IV and preambular paragraphs 6 and 7"), item 16 C (2), which meant the same as item 16 A (1), and the last part of item 16 D (1) ("especially in their relationship to article III (1), (2), (4) and preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 as well as to articles I and II"). The Iranian delegation was prepared to submit another proposal to the Committee if it preferred the second option.

31. Mr. DONNELLY (United Kingdom) said that the wording of the draft agenda was acceptable as it stood. Regarding the Iranian delegation's proposal, items 16 A and C did not share the same introductory text and the articles should be examined in a different light. Item 16 C (2) was not therefore redundant. Moreover, it would be inadvisable to drop the end of item 16 D (1) because the relationship between the articles of the Treaty had been explicitly indicated precisely in order to facilitate the work of the Conference. Furthermore, such a method of procedure was not new and had always proved acceptable to the members of the Conference in the past.

32. Mr. BAIDI-NAJED (Islamic Republic of Iran) submitted a proposal which corresponded to the second option. He suggested inserting the following wording in item 16 A (1): "especially in their relationship to article III, paragraphs 1, 2 and 4, preambular paragraphs 4 and 5 and article IV." He also proposed adding the following wording to item 16 B (2): "especially in their relationship to article II and preambular paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 12."

33. Mr. ERRERA (France) shared the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation. Article IV of the Treaty expressly referred to the provisions of articles I and II. That was why the relationship between the articles mentioned in the draft agenda conformed to the letter and spirit of the Treaty. In addition, the current wording was also consistent with experience and common sense. The first Iranian proposal was therefore unacceptable. The second proposal did not immediately appear to be acceptable because the relationships it established were not stipulated in the Treaty.

34. Mr. BAIDA-NAJED (Islamic Republic of Iran) said he did not dispute that article IV of the Treaty referred to articles I and II, but he questioned the advisability of indicating those relationships explicitly in a procedural document such as the agenda.

35. Mr. DONNELLY (United Kingdom), speaking in support of the representative of France, asked for more time to study the second Iranian proposal, which was new.

Nevertheless he felt it necessary to inform the Committee of his initial reaction. While acknowledging that the proposed modifications would introduce a certain formal symmetry, he also noted that they might lead to a duplication of certain discussions. The current wording of the agenda was not new and the Preparatory Committees of previous Conferences must have had good reasons for proceeding as they did. Basically, the existence of a relationship between various articles did not necessarily imply a reciprocal link.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.